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REVENUE SHARING AND THE
LESSONS OF THE NEW FEDERALISM
LAWRENCE SUSSKIND*
Over the past few years Congress has taken steps to check the rapid
proliferation of categorical grants-in-aid.' While the overall level of
federal support to state and local governments has continued to rise,
recent legislative efforts have been aimed at minimizing the restrictions
placed on federal funds channeled through to state and local govern-
ments.2 Minimizing the number of restrictions imposed on the use of
federal funds is the central objective of the "New Federalism." In
October 1972 Congress passed the State and Local Fiscal Assistance
Act (General Revenue Sharing) which promised to return more than
30 billion dollars in federal tax revenue to state and local governments
over a five-year period.3 In 1973 and 1974 Congress moved closer to
*Associate Professor of Urban Studies & Planning, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology. A.B., Columbia University, 1968; M.C.P., 1970; Ph.D., Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology, 1973.
1. Between 1962 and 1966 the number of categorical grant programs increased
from 160 to 349 and by 1969 the total exceeded 400. 1972 was the second year
in a row, however, in which virtually no growth occurred in the number of federal
categorical grant programs.
2. In dollar terms, federal disbursements for grants-in-aid showed a slowing of
what had been remarkable growth in the past few years; but the total did not
decrease. From a total of 35.9 billion dollars in fiscal 1972, outlays rose to an
estimated 38.2 billion dollars in fiscal 1973 and are projected to reach 38.8 bil-
lion dollars in 1974. SPECIAL ANALYSIS, BUDoEr OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERN-
MENT: FiscAL YEAR 1974, at 224 (1973).
3. In October 1972 Public Law 92-512, known as General Revenue Sharing, was
passed by the Congress and signed into law by President Nixon. State and Local
Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972, 31 U.S.C. §§ 1221-63 (Supp. I, 1972). General
Revenue Sharing provides for approximately 30.2 billion dollars to be distributed
to the more than 38,000 state and local governments over a five year period. The
state and local units will receive their revenue sharing checks in seven install-
ments beginning January 1, 1972, and ending December 31, 1976.
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enacting several of President Nixon's "special" revenue sharing
proposals aimed at consolidating more than 100 categorical
grants-in-aid and providing as much as 10 billion dollars a year for
urban community development, rural community development, man-
power training, law enforcement, transportation and education.4
Federal aid to state and local governments has traditionally taken
one of several forms: (1) categorical grants-in-aid involving nationally
defined programs (often operated on a matching basis) that are
designed to cope with high priority problems; (2) block grants that
are designed to consolidate narrow categorical grants or to redistribute
federal surpluses; and (3) intergovernmental loans. Categorical grants
4. On March 15, 1973, then Attorney General Richard Kleindienst appeared
before a Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee to introduce the Law
Enforcement Revenue Sharing Act of 1973. H.R. 5613, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973); S. 1234, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). The proposal for special revenue
sharing in this area was viewed as an extension of the block grant component of
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (LEAA). 18 U.S.C.
§§ 921 et seq., 1201 et seq. (app.), 2501 et seq. 1970; 42 U.S.C. § 3701 et seq.
(1970). Also, in March 1973 HEW Secretary Weinberger testified before the
General Education Subcommittee of the House Education and Labor Committee
and presented the Administration's Better Schools Act of 1973. This bill would
have consolidated more than 30 categorical grant programs for education. Both
bills were killed by Congress in 1973.
The Administration's transportation initiative calls for the establishment of a
Unified Transportation Assistance Program (UTAP) that would eventually con-
solidate highway and mass transit funds into a single transportation grant program.
H.R. 12859, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); S. 3035, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
Funds would be distributed on the basis of population and UTAP would mean
the demise of the Highway Trust Fund. The Economic Adjustment Assistance
Act of 1974, H.R. 12942, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); S. 3041, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1974), the Administration's revised rural development proposal, would pro-
vide for a one year extension of the present Economic Development Program in
the Department of Commerce. Both bills are under review by congressional com-
mittees in 1974.
In March 1974 the Senate passed the Housing and Community Development
Act of 1974, a vastly modified version of the Nixon Administration's proposed
Better Communities Act (special urban development revenue sharing). Unlike
General Revenue Sharing, governments seeking community development funds
would be required to submit detailed plans and applications. A compromise version
of the President's manpower special revenue sharing bill was signed into law on
December 28, 1973. The measure, known as the Comprehensive Employment and
Training Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-203, 87 Stat. 839, brings to an end nearly
a year of intensive debate between the Administration and Congress over the direc-
tion of federal manpower activities. Enactment of the bill gives the Nixon Admin-
istration its first special revenue sharing victory. For up-dated reports on special
and general revenue sharing see R-vENUE SHARNO BULLETIN published monthly
by the Revenue Sharing Advisory Service in Washington, D.C., from which many
of the comments presented here are drawn.
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have been by far the most important source of intergovernmental fiscal
aid in the United States. Federal assistance to state and local govern-
ments grew from seven billion dollars in 1960 to nearly 45 billion dol-
lars in 1973. The national government now contributes more than
25% of all state and local revenues. In 1973 categorical grants ac-
counted for more than 95% of all intergovernmental transfers.
Prior to the enactment of General Revenue Sharing, a few attempts
had been made to distribute open-ended federal grants. These in-
duded the Mineral Leasing Act, the National Forest Fund, Land
Grant Payments to counties in California and Oregon, and a unique
distribution of an embarrassing 27 million dollar federal surplus in
1837.5 In the 1960's several additional block grant programs were
initiated, but these were not entirely open-ended. The Manpower
Development and Training Act, the Partnership for Health Program,
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, and the Safe Streets Act
were all designed to consolidate categorical grants in broad program
areas. Federal restrictions on the use of these funds, although not
quite as stringent as those typically imposed upon categorical grants,
distinguished consolidated block grants from the totally open-ended
formula grants.
Although intergovernmental loan programs involving substantial
amounts of money have flourished in the United States, they have
been limited almost exclusively to federal housing programs. In 1973
the federal government loaned 1.8 billion dollars to state and local
governments; grants from the Department of Housing and Urban
Development comprised 80% of this amount.
The shift from categorical grants to general revenue sharing and
block grants as the form of intergovernmental transfer represents an
important turning point in the evolution of the American federal sys-
tem. What factors account for this shift? WNhat forces propel such
changes in the balance of power? And how will our intergovern-
mental system work when and if the New Federalism displaces the
federal domestic aid strategy that has evolved over the past forty years?
I. AsSUMPTIONS OF THE NEw FEDERALISM
The basic thrust of the New Federalism, exemplified by the domes-
tic assistance proposals of the Nixon Administration, is to reduce the
federal government's impact on state and local policy-making. The
5. W. GRAVES, AMERICAN INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS 489-90 (1964).
19741
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
principal tactic for achieving this reform will not be the withdrawal
of federal support for key domestic programs; rather a concerted effort
will be made to decategorize and broaden federal grants-in-aid. Al-
though some inconsistencies are apparent (e.g., the President's at-
tempts to further centralize income support and welfare programs
and to impound certain funds appropriated by Congress), the funda-
mental characteristic of the New Federalism has been its emphasis
on decentralization. 6
Many arguments are made in favor of decentralization. By mini-
mizing the federal government's size, the advocates of decentralization
expect: (1) to reduce the concentration of power at the top; (2) to
permit greater flexibility in problem-solving; (3) to acknowledge the
different needs of each community; (4) to encourage innovation by
allowing similarly situated communities to experiment with different
solutions to public problems; and (5) to encourage the development
of political subsystems that allow for widespread participation.7 To
the extent that supporters of the New Federalism espouse a consistent
philosophy, these arguments in behalf of decentralization provide a
relatively firm ideological base. Their arguments are most often ac-
companied by the firm belief that the national government is not
inherently more "liberal" on domestic issues than are states and
localities.
The New Federalism represents more than a philosophy of govern-
ment; it constitutes a distinct political strategy as well. Three im-
portant assumptions underlie current shifts in grant-in-aid policy.
The first, aimed at winning the support of fiscal conservatives, sug-
gests that state and local governments are suffering severe financial
strains that are caused in part by the federal government's efforts over
the past thirty years to preempt the most productive sources of tax
revenue. The second assumption, that states and localities are more
qualified to define and address themselves to municipal needs than
the national government, is designed to attract the support of the de-
centralists. This same group points to constitutional limitations that
they claim prohibit the federal government from interfering in cer-
tain areas of domestic concern. The third, and most politically potent
assumption, suggests that categorical grants-in-aid serve primarily to
6. See Nathan, Essay on Special Revenue Sharing (a paper presented at the
Conference on Approaches to Accountability in Post-Categorical Programs, Stan-
ford Research Institute, Aug. 20, 1973).
7. Id. at 10.
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support an inefficient and self-indulgent bureaucracy in Washington.
This last assumption appeals broadly to the belief held by both rural
and suburban interests that the centralized administration of grant
programs not only favors major urban areas and minority groups, but
also strengthens the hand of non-elected groups at the expense of duly
elected officials in city hall.
These assumptions are indeed appealing, especially to the groups
that formed the backbone of the 1968 Republican majority. The
question is are they valid. Political support for the New Federalism
will certainly erode if evidence emerges to suggest that a shift away
from categorical grants-in-aid will not accomplish these objectives.
II. SOLVING STATE AND LOCAL FISCAL PROBLEMS
One of the arguments put forward in the 1960's in support of reve-
nue sharing was that it offered an efficient means of solving the coun-
try's long-term budgetary problems. A steadily rising full-employ-
ment, a federal surplus, and widespread fiscal deficiencies at the state
and local level were anticipated. Walter Heller, one of the originators
of the revenue sharing concept, recommended "unrestricted federal
grants to the states" as a method of reducing fiscal drag.8 Heller and
others predicted that after the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam
the nation would realize a "peace dividend" followed by several years
of federal budget surpluses. It seemed logical that federal revenues
derived from existing tax sources would increase more rapidly than
expenditures for domestic programs since federal revenues are based
primarily on the rapidly growing and generally progressive income
tax. The transfer of federal revenue to states and localities appeared
a more effective method of transition to a peace time economy than
a tax reduction. At the same time, federal funds would be available
to meet a wide range of state and local needs. To expedite enactment
and minimize opposition, Heller proposed revenue sharing in its
simplest possible form-distribution to the states on a population
basis, without strings or pass-through requirements.9
By the late 1960's state and local officials were predicting a "revenue
8. W. HELLER, NEW DIMENSIONS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 132 (1966).
9. Musgrave & Polinsky, Revenue Sharing-A Critical View, in FINANCING
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 17-52 (1970).
19741
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
gap" of serious proportions.1 0 They pointed to the rising costs of state
and local services (most notably in the areas of education and wel-
fare), which they claimed were increasing more rapidly than available
revenues. The estimates were indeed alarming. In January 1967 the
National League of Cities commissioned TEMPO, General Electric's
Center for Advanced Studies, to prepare a study of the revenue gap.
TEMPO predicted that the cities would face a staggering 262 billion
dollar revenue gap in the 10 year period from 1966 - 1975.11 On the
strength of these and similar projections by other organizations, the
decentralists began building support for the revenue sharing concept.
Many big-city mayors claimed that without some form of federal
revenue sharing they would be forced to curtail vital services or even
to declare their cities bankrupt.
In 1972 the Department of Commerce first reported a reversal in
the aggregate financial position of state and local governments. 2 In
fact, a surplus appeared. This was explained in part by recently in-
troduced personal and corporate taxes that were both more progres.
10. Robinson, Financing State and Local Government: The Outlook for 1975(an undated occasional paper prepared by the Council of State Governments based
on the work of the State and Local Finance Project headed by Dr. Selma
Mushkin).
An analysis published by Brookings economists Allen Manvel and Robert Reis-
chauer concluded:
If state and local tax rates remain unchanged and federal grants-in-aid con-
tinue... (with no new programs but with an expansion in existing programs
to take account of price and workload increases), total revenues of state and
local governments may be expected to rise to about $251.7 billion by 1976.
If the quality and scope of state and local services increase at roughly the
rate observed between 1965 and 1969, then total expenditures may be ex-
pected to rise to about $261.1 billion by 1976 .... [T]he most rapid increases
will be in higher education and welfare (assuming that the federal govern-
ment does not substantially increase its contribution) and general administra.
tion.
Manvel & Reischauer, General Revenue Sharing, in SETTING NATIONAL PRIOR-
ITIrEs, THE 1972 BUDGET 134, 140 (C. Shultze, E. Fried, A. Rivlin & N. Teeters
eds. 1971).
11. NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES, U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS & INTER-
NATIONAL CITY MANAGEMENT Ass'N, THE FISCAL PLIGHT OF AMERICAN CITIES
(1971). This report concluded that the causes of the fiscal pressures on cities
were as follows: (1) nearsighted federal programs; (2) neglect by state govern-
ments; (3) demands for more municipal services by the public coupled with a
demand for increased pay by municipal employees; and (4) the difficulty of
raising revenue.
12. 52 SURVEY OF CURRENT BUS., No. 10, at 1 (Oct. 1972).
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sive and more sensitive to economic growth. 13 In 1970 state and local
surpluses reached a postwar high of 3.8 billion dollars, which after a
brief decline, rose to the remarkable level of 19.5 billion dollars in
the fourth quarter of 1972.14 The unexpected surplus caused some to
wonder whether the federal government was "impoverishing" itself
while putting state and local governments in a position of relative
fiscal affluence.15 Recent projections for the second half of the 1970's
are even more encouraging. The American Enterprise Institute (AEI)
and the Brookings Institution have predicted that state and local
revenues will continue to exceed expenditures. 6 The AEI study sug-
gests that aggregate reserves could rise to 2.6 billion dollars by 1980,
although predicted surpluses could disappear if national financial
conditions change or if municipalities are called upon to absorb new
costs for equalization of educational facilities, pollution control, or
mass transit. If the surpluses persist they will certainly have an ad-
verse effect on efforts to renew general revenue sharing when the
present authorization expires.
13. The federal government has literally cornered the income tax market. In
1969 it collected 91.1% of all income tax, state governments collected 7.9% and
local governments 1.0%. In comparison to all other taxes, the income tax is the
most effective money raiser. For every one per cent of growth in the nation's
economy, individual income tax receipts rise by about 1.5%. In 1960, 19 states
were imposing both general sales and personal income taxes. Within a few years
the number had increased to 33. During the same period, state and local tax
collections outpaced national economic growth. State and local taxes rose from
the equivalent of 7.3% of the GNP in 1960 to 8.6% by 1970. More than 53%
of the growth was spurred by legislation that raised existing taxes and introduced
new ones, ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL REGULATIONS, FINAL
REPORT: REVENUE SHARaNG--AN IDEA WHosE TIME HAs CoME 4 (1970).
In 1971 there were 64 tax rate increases throughout the country including 13
corporation income tax increases. In addition, three new personal income taxes
and two new corporate income taxes were enacted. ADvisory COMM'N ON INTER-
GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE-LOCAL FINANCES: SIGNIFICANT FEATURES AND
SUGGESTED LEGISLATION 176 (1972).
14. Gramlich & Galper, State and Local Fiscal Behavior and Federal Grant
Policy, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON EcoNoMIC ACTIVITY 15-66 (A. Okun & G. Perry
eds. 1973). The authors do point out that the 19 billion dollar figure is a "soft"
surplus, explainable in part by the idiosyncrasies of state and local budgeting.
Id. at 46. Nonetheless, a surplus of some proportion clearly was accumulating.
In January 1973, for example, both California and North Carolina amassed
multi-million dollar budget surpluses. In both states the governors proposed to
return substantial amounts of money to local taxpayers through a tax referral.
15. See D. OTT et al., NIXON, McGOVERN AND THE FEDERAL BUDGET (Ameri-
can Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research 1972).
16. See E. FRIED, A. RrVLIN, C. SCHULTZE & N. TEETERS, SETTING NATIONAL
PRIORITIES: THE 1974 BUDGET (1973); D. OTT et al., PUBLIC CLAIMS ON UNITED
STATES OUTPUT (American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research 1973).
1974]
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When temporary deficits in particular states or localities actually
occurred, they were handled in several ways: by raising tax rates, utiliz-
ing new tax sources, raising property assessment ratios, or deferring
programs. Some of these approaches are merely stop-gap measures.
State and local debt ceilings, for example, have constitutionally set
limits. Efforts to raise tax rates invariably evoke strong voter resist-
ance and tend to accentuate the problem of interstate competition for
new industry.'1
Paradoxically, one effect of revenue sharing has been to reduce the
amount of money available to the public sector. A portion of all
revenue sharing funds is invariably used to reduce state or local taxes.
Revenue sharing thereby inhibits the growth of state and local tax
yield. One study estimates that an annual flow of 5.5 billion dollars
in general revenue sharing funds will increase state and local expend-
itures by an average of only two to three billion dollars. The re-
mainder of the money will probably be devoted to tax reductions1 s
Even if one assumes that the cost of municipal services will out-
distance the availability of revenues at the state and local level (and
this is not likely to occur),' 9 it is questionable whether the federal
government has the resources to rectify the imbalance. Strong opposi-
tion to general revenue sharing appeared when it passed in 1972.20
Many congressmen felt that the federal government did not have sur-
plus revenues to give away. When General Revenue Sharing was
signed into law, some congressmen labeled it "deficit sharing" since
in that year alone the federal government added an additional 23
billion dollars to the national debL21 Other opponents of the bill
argued that state and local governments had not exhausted their own
local resources. 22 Although methods of measuring fiscal capacity are
hard to agree upon, the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations (ACIR) has constructed an index to predict how much tax
revenue would be raised under a representative tax system. Assuming
a more equitable and vigorous tax effort throughout the country,
17. M. WEIDENBAUM, PROSPECTS FOR REALLOCATING PUnLIC RESOURCES S
(1967) [hereinafter cited as WEIDENBAUM].
18. Gramlich & GaIper, supra note 14, at 50.
19. See text at 12-16 supra; text at note 23 infra.
20. For a thorough legislative history of General Revenue Sharing see R.
THOMPSON, A NEW ERA IN FEDERALISM? (1973).
21. Id. at ch. 5.
22. H. Rzuss, REVENUE-SHARING 71 (1970).
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merely reshuffling existing state and local resources could probably
close any fiscal gap between relative expenditure needs and relative
expenditure capacities that might arise.23
Advocates of the New Federalism have suggested that revenue
sharing and unconditional block grants will provide a more progres-
sive tax pattern by sharing federal tax dollars, thereby minimizing
the need for local reliance on regressive tax sources such as the property
tax. Substitution of federal funds for locally generated tax dollars,
it is assumed, will enable municipalities to hold down their tax rates.
Lower tax rates, it is argued, will help cities retain industry and
attract upper-income residents back into the city core, thereby start-
ing a cycle of revival. Local tax increases, however, are not in fact the
result of a revenue gap at the local level. To the extent that a fiscal
crisis exists, it is really on the expenditure side of the ledger. Finan-
cial difficulties at the local level revolve mostly around the inadequa-
cies of local fiscal planning and management.24
Although municipal budgets have been generously padded to meet
patronage demands, city governments have not developed the col-
lective bargaining skills necessary to cope with the demands of public
employee unions. Politicians apparently have decided that the politi-
cal costs of strikes are greater than the economic costs of acceding to
union demands for escalator clauses in municipal contracts. In addi-
tion, many cities have been forced to accept expensive pension arrange-
ments that will dramatically increase the costs of city government in
future years even though the quality of services will probably not im-
prove. Finally, urban politicians have been unable to recoup suburban
tax dollars that might be used to underwrite the costs of key city
23. Musgrave & Polinsky, supra note 9, at 41. A significant measure of rev-
enue effort is a comparison of revenues raised by state and local governments from
their own sources with personal income within each state. The ranking of the
states in these terms (special revenue as a percentage of personal income) demon-
strates substantial variation, from less than 12% to a high of about 20% in fiscal
1970), The average revenue effort made by all 50 states and the District of Colum-
bia was 14,5% in fiscal 1970. If all states and localities had made a revenue effort
equal to the average of the top ten, which was 17.3%, they would have raised
nearly 21 billion dollars in additional revenues. These statistics were compiled
and comeputed by the Staff of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation.
THoMPSoN, supra note 20, at 13.
24. See RICHMOND STU>Y TAsK FORcE, THE IMpAcT OF FEDERAL GwNrs-m-
Ao ix RicHMto,D, ViMOINIA (1971) (prepared for the Federal Regional Council
in Philadelphia, Pa.); P. Dearborn et at., Fiscal Emergencies in Major American
Cities (draft 1973, prepared for the Advisory Comm'n on Intergovernmental
Relations).
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services enjoyed by all metropolitan residents. For the most part,
these are managerial and organizational issues that concern the ways
in which costs are allocated and revenues managed. The income from
revenue sharing and block grants, especially those with few or no
strings attached, will contribute very little to the improvement of fiscal
management capabilities at the local level.
M. THE NEw FEDERALISM-CHANGING THE BALANCE OF POWER
IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
The New Federalists want to change the balance of power in the
federal system by strengthening the position of the states vis-h-vis the
national government. They look upon revenue sharing as a tool
for altering the entire structure of the federal system and pro-
viding a more independent and vigorous role for the states.25 The
New Federalists are actually making three separate assumptions that
need to be examined in light of the first few years' experience with
general revenue sharing and block grants. First, they assume that
states and localities are closer to the people and are therefore better
able to recognize public priorities. Secondly, they suggest that state
and local officials can be trusted to use federal funds honestly and
efficiently. Lastly, they expect decentralization to encourage innova-
tion and ensure greater respect for the diverse needs and interests of
minority groups.
A. State and Local Governments-Are They Closer to the People?
The advocates of the New Federalism suggest that, aside from
solving fiscal emergencies at the state and local level, revenue sharing
will lead to greater popular control over public spending and govern-
mental decision-making since states and localities are "a lot closer" to
the diverse interests and needs of citizens in different communities.
They believe that revenue sharing and unrestricted block grants, by
placing unencumbered funds at the disposal of smaller governmental
units, will guarantee each citizen a larger role in the decision-making
process. Furthermore, they argue, if states and localities are required
to make difficult decisions about the allocation of large amounts of
federal money, citizen participation at state and local levels is likely
to increase. The decentralists also argue that if new ideas are not
25. C. GOETZ, WHAT Is REwu SHARING? 67 (1972).
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generated at the local level, the power of the federal government will
continue to grow and the bureaucracy will become rigid26
Our nationwide communications system has allowed national poli-
ticians to become better known to their constituents than their state
and local counterparts. Yet one observer has suggested that this one-
way communication is not an effective indication of how well in-
formed national officials are of the electorate's needs.2 7 Indeed, there
is a substantial "distance" between federal decision-makers in Wash-
ington and their local constituents, but this may well be more a matter
of priorities than of miles. Throughout the 1960's elected officials in
small cities and suburban towns were frustrated in their attempts to
obtain federal categorical grants. Is it any wonder they support pro-
posed changes in the grant-in-aid system? A state or local govern-
ment cannot trade a low priority project for one that it considers
more important. They may find it possible to secure a 20 million
dollar grant for an unnecessary expressway extension but be refused
$200,000 for a desperately needed sewer treatment plant. Edward
Banfield suggests that this involves a double waste; that is, a waste
of what is taken (local authorities rarely refuse "free" money) and a
waste of the foregone benefits of desirable projects for which grants
are unavailable. 2 8 This view ignores two important points. First,
many categorical grants require a matching contribution to ensure
genuine local interest and in these cases funds are not free. Secondly,
projects that are of such high local priority, but not necessarily of
pressing national significance, probably should be funded at the local
level without federal assistance.
The larger cities employ experts in the art of "grantsmanship"
while many smaller communities cannot afford to employ such pro-
fessionals. Local officials find that they must apply to scores, or even
26, Daniel Elazar writes:
IT]he sheer size of the national bureaucracy creates a degree of remoteness,inefficiency, and waste that rivals that of the least professional state govern-
ment.... Part of the strength of the American political system derives from
our understanding that where men are free it is not always necessary to use
direct national action to achieve national goals. Often, they can be as effec-
tively achieved through local or state action, and in such cases the results
are almost certain to be more enduring because the decisions are more solidly
rooted in public opinion.
Elazar, The New Federalism: Can the States Be Trusted?, Spring 1974 PUB. IN-
TEREST 89, 101.
27. Id. at 101.
28. Banfield, Revenue Sharing in Theory and Practice, Spring 1971 PUB. IN-
TEREST 33, 40.
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hundreds, of programs, each with its own special requirements and
administered by a different bureaucracy. 29 The decentralists claim that
such inefficiency could be eliminated by wiping out separate categori-
cal grant authorizations and channeling federal funds to local units
of government without any spending restrictions. While this may
represent a sincere concern for governmental efficiency, a cynical ob-
server might construe such opposition to categorical grants as a politi-
cally motivated effort to ensure that federal funds will be more evenly
distributed across the nation.
Assuming, arguendo, that the issue is in fact a basic disagreement
over priorities rather than one of efficiency, local governments are
claiming that Congress has been unresponsive to their needs. Local
officials are convinced that, with additional federal support, they
could respond more capably to local needs. A recent opinion poll
undertaken by the ACIR suggests that most people would not support
this assertion. In 1972 and again in 1973 a plurality of those surveyed
indicated that they had more confidence in the federal government's
ability to spend tax dollars wisely than in the ability of a state or
local government to do so. 30 Even more significant is the evidence
of a definite public preference for federal control over local alloca-
tion of grants-in-aid. Forty-eight per cent of those interviewed indi-
cated a belief that federal funds are used more efficiently when granted
to state and local governments for specific purposes rather than to be
used as local officials think best. Only 30% wished to see federal
funds passed along to state and local governments with no strings
attached.31
State and local units of government reported that only 42.5% of
the 6.6 billion dollars in revenue sharing funds disbursed had been
29. Id. at 41.
30. When asked: "From which level of government do you feel you get the
most for your money-federal, state, or local?" the responses were:
Per cent of Total U.S.
Public
1973 1972
Federal 35 39
State 18 18
Local 25 26
Don't Know 22 17
ADvIsoRY COM''N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL PELATIONS, REvENuE SHARING AND
TAXEs [9] (1973) (unpaginated report).
31. Id. at [2].
[Vol. 8:33
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expended by June 30, 1973.3 - According to the expenditure reports
filed with the federal government, most of these funds were used for
education, public safety, public transportation, environmental pro-
tection/conservation, and multi-purpose/general governmental con-
erns. (See Table I.) State governments used 65% of their revenue
sharing funds for education alone. Over 44% of all governmental
units indicated that revenue sharing funds were used to reduce or
avoid tax increases, and nearly one-third indicated that such funds
helped either to avoid or lessen debt increases. (See Table 11.)
Eighty per cent of all general revenue sharing funds went to support
existing rather than new programs."
Over half of the cities receiving revenue sharing funds did not hold
public hearings prior to determining their revenue sharing expendi-
tures. 4 City officials may have been reluctant to encourage extensive
public involvement since the amount of revenue could not, in most
cases, have covered all the uses that would have been suggested.
Revenue sharing funds accounted ultimately for less than 10% of
most cities' annual income and less than six per cent of annual state
revenue collections. When local governments were asked if they
planned to hold public hearings in the future, 37.4% said yes,
38.4% said no, and 24.2% were unsure.3 5 The decentralists would
have us believe that the power of the federal government ought to be
minimized to achieve the goal of local self-determination. Yet how can
there be local involvement and control when few cities are willing to
make an effort to encourage citizen participation in the local budget-
ary Process?-;G
32, D. CAPUTO & R. COLE, REvENuE SHAauNG: THE FIRST ACTUAL USE RE-
PORTS I (Mar. 1974) (prepared for the Office of Revenue Sharing, U.S. Dep't of
the Treasury).
33. Id. at 6. There is some doubt about the accuracy of the Planned Use and
Actual Use Reports submitted by state and local governments. It is practically
impossible to double check the figures contained in these reports because of the
substitution and displacement of funds that seems to be occurring.
34. See Caputo & Cole, Revenue Sharing and Urban Services: A Survey, 34
TAx REv., No. 10 (Oct. 1973). In March 1973 questionnaires were sent to the
thief administrative officials in all cities with 1970 populations of 50,000 or
greater. Of the 409 cities sent questionnaires, 212 responded.
35. See id.
36. Cannon & Broder, Nixon's "New Federalism": Struggle to Prove Itself,
Washington Post, June 17, 1973, § A, at 1, col. 1; Cannon & Broder, Revenue
Pie Ignores Social Services, Washington Post, June 18, 1973, § A, at 1, col. 5;
Cannor & Broder, The Promise: The Reality, Washington Post, June 19, 1973,
§ A, at 1, col. 6.
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Table I*
REPORTED ACTUAL USE OF GENERAL REVENUE
SHARING-ALL UNITS OF GOVERNMENT-1/1/726/30/73**
(in millions of dollars)
Operating and Maintenance Capital
Percent Percent Percent
of Percent of Total of Total
Amount Category for New Amount Category Amount Funds
Category Expended Expended Services Expended Expended Expended Expended
Public Safety $ 496.4 76% 8% $158.8 24% $ 655.2 23%
Environmental
Protection/
Conservation
Public Transportation
Health
Recreation/Culture
Libraries
Social Services for
the Poor or Aged
Financial
Administration
Education
Multi-Purpose/Gen-
eral Government
Social Development
Housing/Community
Development
Economic
Development
Other
92.5
183.8
99.3
35.6
18.5
49%
44%
60%
31%
100%
16%
12%
8%
28%
14%
88.1 100% 13%
69.9 100% 13%
643.0 94% 39%
95.3
233.1
66.5
81.1
51%
56%
40%
69%
187.8
416.9
165.8
116.7
18.5
- - 88.1 3%
- - 69.9 2%
44.2 6% 687.2 24%
- - - 183.7 100%
- - - 12.9 100%
183.7 6%
12.9 .5%
- 26.0 100% 26.0 1%
- - - 11.6
149.8 84% 3% 27.8
100%
16%
11.6
177.6
Totals $1876.9 67% 20% $941.0 33% $2817.9 100%**l
All Units: Total Amount Disbursed $6620.7
Total Amount Expended $2817.9
Percent Expended 42.5
*C. CAPUTO & R. COLE, REVENUE SHARING: THE FIRST ACTUAL USE REPORTS
4 (Mar. 1974) (prepared for the Office of Revenue Sharing, U.S. Dep't of
the Treasury).
**Note: Totals are calculated on total amounts of revenue sharing funds dis.
bursed and total amounts expended as reported in the analyzed reports.
The totals do not include earned interest on revenue sharing disburse-
ments nor do they include estimates for the reports not yet available
when these analyses were made. In the tables which follow, totals may
not always equal one another due to rounding procedures and errors.
***Percents do not total 100% because of rounding.
A major national study of citizen participation in the budgetary
process is currently underway.37 Preliminary findings suggest that
37. The League of Women Voters Education Fund, the National Urban Coali-
tion, and the Center for Community Change are working through their local affili-
ates to study local budgeting and citizen participation in the allocation of revenue
sharing funds in more than 60 municipalities and a dozen states. Support for
the project comes from the Edna McConnell Clark Foundation. At a national
meeting of local monitoring project directors (Wingspread Conference Center,
Racine, Wisconsin, June 26-27, 1974) status reports on each city were presented.
A final report will be prepared by the Revenue Sharing Clearinghouse and the
Center for National Policy Review in Washington, D.C.
.5%
601
*
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Table II*
IMPACT OF ACTUAL USE OF GENERAL REVENUE SHARING
FUNDS ON GOVERNMENTAL TAXES OF THOSE UNITS
SPENDING 50 PERCENT OR MORE OF THEIR GENERAL
REVENUE SHARING FUNDS
Reducing
orPreventint IndicatingIndicatine Too Soon
Governmental Tax Increase No Effect to Predict
Unit Number/Percent Number/Percent Number/Percent
States and District
of Columbia 6 35.3% 7 41.2% 4 23.5%
Counties 815 62.9% 260 20.0% 222 17.1%
Cities 4040 48.8% 2336 28.2% 1907 23.0%
Townships 3708 47.0% 2032 25.7% 2156 27.3%
Indian Tribes
and Alaskan
Native Villages 1 1.8% 43 75.4% 13 22.8%
Total for All Units
of Government 8570 48.8% 4678 26.7% 4302 24.5%
*C. CAPUTO & R. COLE, REVENUE SHARING: THE FIRST ACTUAL USE REPORT
46 (Mar. 1974) (prepared for the Office of Revenue Sharing, U.S. Dep't of the
Treasury).
without strong pressure from the federal government (such as the re-
quirements for maximum feasible participation enforced in conjunc-
tion with grants to Model Cities Agencies or Community Action Pro-
grams), state and local officials are not likely to promote citizen
participation. In one Massachusetts municipality, the city manager
informed a coalition of community groups that "general revenue
sharing is for me to use to keep the tax rate down. Special revenue
sharing, when and if it passes, is for you to decide how to use."38
Most revenue sharing monitoring projects around the country are
likely to underscore the unwillingness of local officials to open up the
budgetary process to the public or to urge citizen participation in the
allocation of revenue sharing funds.3 9 It appears that the often re-
38. See L. SussxixN, FINAL REPORT OF THE REVENUE SHARING MONITORING
PROJeCT PILOT STUDY (1973) (prepared for the three public interest groups
listed in note 37 supra). The quotation is from an interview in August 1973
undertaken as part of a pilot test of the Local Revenue Sharing Monitoring In-
struments prepared by the M.I.T./Harvard Joint Center for Urban Studies for the
Clark Foundation funded study of General Revenue Sharing. The city and the city
manager were promised anonymity as part of the arrangements for the pre-test.
39. One of the larger monitoring studies is a Ford Foundation supported effort
under the direction of Richard Nathan at the Brookings Institution. See Nathan
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peated hope that revenue sharing would increase citizen involvement
in local decision-making is not likely to be realized. One amendment
to the revenue sharing law4 0 introduced by Senator Symington, a
Missouri Democrat, would require recipient governments to hold
public hearings in which interested individuals or groups could par-
ticipate in decisions about the use of general revenue sharing funds.
If the decentralists' assumptions were correct the federal government
would not need to mandate citizen participation at the local level. 41
In reality, however, local officials seem more intent on using revenue
sharing funds to hold down local tax rates, thus ensuring their own
political futures, than on using these funds to meet pressing local
needs that would require the expansion of existing services or the
creation of new ones.
In connection with the question whether local officials are respon-
sive to pressing local needs, recall that one of the objectives of general
revenue sharing is to provide state and local governments with greater
flexibility in the use of federal funds. Accordingly, General Revenue
Sharing contains only general guidelines delimiting how governmental
units may spend their share. A local government may use the funds
for any "ordinary and necessary capital expenditure authorized by
law."4 2 In addition, funds are to be spent only within specified
priority areas, one of which is described as "social services for the
poor and aged."43 An analysis of general revenue sharing allocations
& Manvel, Monitoring Revenue Sharing, 1 PUB. DATA USE, No. 2, at 12-16 (Apr.
1973).
40. See H.R. 6593, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). With the start of the 94th
Congress reenactment of general revenue sharing will be under consideration. The
present program is authorized through the end of 1976, and if it is to be extended
Congress must act during the 94th Congress (1975-76).
41. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
42. State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972, 31 U.S.C. § 1222(a) (2)
(Supp. II, 1972).
43. The statute reads in part:
(a) In general.
Funds received by units of local government under this subchapter
may be used only for priority expenditures. For the purposes of this
chapter, the term "priority expenditures" means only-
(1) ordinary and necessary maintenance and operating expenses for-(A) public safety (including law enforcement, fire protection,
and building code enforcement),(B) environmental protection (including sewage disposal, sani-
tation, and pollution abatement),(C) public transportation (including transit systems and streets
and roads),
(D) health,
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in 250 governments (including the 50 cities and 50 counties that re-
ceived the largest amounts of revenue sharing funds in 1972) pre-
pared by the Comptroller General of the United States,44 indicates a
miniscule response on the part of local governments to the needs of
the poor and aged. These 250 governments received about 1.66 bil-
lion dollars through June 30, 1973, or about 38% of the approximately
4.4 billion dollars distributed to all local governments. 45 Only 28 of
the units studied had authorized the expenditure of part of their
revenue sharing funds for programs or activities specifically designed
to serve the elderly.4 These authorizations totaled about 2.9 million
dollars or about two-tenths of one per cent of the total funds authorized
for expenditure by 218 of the governments surveyed.47 The remaining
32 units had not authorized the expenditure of any of their revenue
sharing funds.48 These scant expenditures clearly do not indicate
responsiveness on the part of local governments to the priority needs
of the elderly.
We are also asked to assume that state governments are, by defini-
tion, closer to the people than is the federal government. Experience
with several precursors of special revenue sharing-the Safe Streets
Program and the Partnership for Health Program-suggest that this
is not the case.19 Under the Law Enforcement Assistance Administra-
tions (LEAA) 5 block grant program established in 1968, federal aid
(E) recreation,
(F) libraries,(G) social services for the poor or aged, and
(H) financial administration; and
(2) ordinary and necessary capital expenditures authorized by law.Id. , 1222.
44. Statement of Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller General of the United States,
Hearings on the General Revenue Sharing Program before the Subcomm. on
Intergovermental Relations of the Senate Comm. on Government Operations,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4-9 (1974); Letter from the Deputy Comptroller General of
the United States to the Honorable Claude Pepper, No. B-14628, undated (copy
on file with L. Susskind).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See L. Susskind, Decision-making and Resource Allocation in State Gov-
ernment: A New Perspective on Revenue Sharing and Strategies for City Sur-
vival chs. 3 & 4, January 17, 1973 (unpublished thesis in the Rotch Library of
the School of Architecture and Planning, M.I.T.).
50. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (LEAA), 18 U.S.C.
49921 et seq., 1201 et seq. (app.), 2501 et seq. (1970); 42 U.S.C. § 3701 et seq.
(1970).
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is distributed among state governments according to a formula based
primarily on population. The block grant (or special revenue shar-
ing) aspects of the program end at the state level, since the majority
of states have chosen to allocate their funds among local jurisdictions
on a project-by-project basis. Most states have replicated the bureau-
cratic confusion, red tape, and paper work for which the federal
government was criticized in its earlier categorical grant programs.51
State governments have also shown considerable reluctance to
distribute LEAA funds. After three years, state agencies had dis-
bursed only one-quarter of the promised funds to sub-units, preferring
instead to bank the money or to devote it to state-manned projects.52
States are required by statute to distribute LEAA funds to each local
government unit in proportion to that local government's expendi-
tures for public safety as compared with such expenditures statewide-
the average figure for local governmental expenditures being approxi-
mately 72% of statewide expenditures.
Scant attention has been paid to this requirement in at least one
state.53 It is also clear that state planning agencies have not followed
the federal guidelines, which suggest that large cities and high-crime
areas should receive special preference.54 Many substate planning
units were created in order to minimize the influence of large cities.66
As a result of this gerrymandering and of the state-run project selec-
tion system, few large cities have received LEAA funds proportionate
to their share of either the states' index crimes or expenditures for
public safety.56
The same insensitivity to big-city needs occurs in the allocation of
state block grant funds in other fields as well. The current behavior
of state education departments suggests that grouping the dozens of
smaller federal school aid programs into a general grant, with state
controlled distribution, would only hurt large city school districts.57
51. R. Reischauer, The New Federalism and the Old Cities: The Local Expendi.
ture Implications of Shifting from Categorical to Block Grants, December 1973
(unpublished manuscript, copy on file with L. Susskind).
52. Housz COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATioNs, BLOCK GRANT PROGRAMS
OF TEE LAW ENFORCEMENT AssisTANcE ADMINISTRATION, H.R. RaP. No. 1072,
92d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1972).
53. Susskind, supra note 49, at ch. 3.
54. Reiscbauer, supra note 51, at 14.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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A cursory review of the allocation formulas built into the Comprehen-
sive Employment and Training Act (special manpower revenue shar-
ing) passed in 1974, as well as the various special community develop-
ment revenue sharing proposals, dearly indicates that large cities can
not expect a larger slice of the federal aid pie under a decategorized
grant system even though their needs are dearly more substantial.
States and localities will rely just as heavily on federal aid regard-
less of its form. Block grants and general revenue sharing will replace
a vast array of public programs controlled by the President and Con-
gress, but it is doubtful whether this will check the centralization of
power at the top. Block grants as well as continued revenue sharing
allocations hinge on congressional appropriations and approval just
as do categorical grants. From the local, and particularly the neigh-
borhood perspective, little difference exists between centralizing au-
thority in the hands of the federal government or in the hands of the
states-except that the national government has perhaps been more
inclined to serve urban areas with proportionately greater needs.
Without the federal controls normally associated with categorical
grants, states are likely to consume large amounts of money in creat-
ing bureaucracies analogous to federal agencies. Citizen participation
at the state level is difficult, if not impossible, and without the imposi-
tion of matching fund requirements, which apply to categorical but
not block grants, it is difficult to develop sufficient legislative support
to ensure long-term institutionalization of demonstration or experi-
mental projects. With regard to the pass-through of money, block
grant funds that do reach cities and towns are invariably controlled
by provider groups and politicians who are connected with decision-
makers at the state level. While categorical grant programs can man-
date citizen participation, block grants and revenue sharing funds
have been used to relieve the pressure on those in political power to
involve out-of-power groups in local allocation decisions58
B. Can State and Local Officials Be Trusted to Spend
Federal Funds Honestly?
Linked to the question of state and local responsiveness is the issue
of trust. Can the states be trusted to serve inner-city residents? Can
city officials be trusted to serve the needs of their minority constituents?
58. See L. Susskind, Decategorization and Emerging Bureaucratic Impediments
to Institutional Reform, March 1974 (unpublished manuscript).
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Can either group be trusted to obey the rules set down by the federal
government designed to ensure accountability and to avoid discrimi-
nation? Revenue sharing funds can be used by local governments for
projects or expenses tied to one or more of the eight priority areas
mentioned in the General Revenue Sharing Act.59 Although local
governments are precluded from meeting education expenses with
revenue sharing funds, capital expenditures for education are per-
mitted.60 No priority restrictions are imposed at the state level.01 In
fact, even the minimal local use restrictions mean very little since a
government has great latitude in choosing the projects it indicates
have received a portion of revenue sharing funds. The case law on
this question is just beginning to develop.62
A surprise ruling by a federal district court prevented the city of
Atlanta from using its general revenue sharing funds for tax relief. In
Mathews v. Massell16 a group of citizens brought a class action suit
against the city alleging that the expenditure of revenue sharing
funds for tax relief was illegal under the revenue sharing law.04 The
city had planned a reduction of 4.5 million dollars in water/sewer
rates charged to firms and individuals. The court enjoined the
city from executing its plan, finding the city's attempt to use federal
funds for tax relief "a sham." 68  The court order represented a
drastic shift in interpretation of the general revenue sharing law.
In 1972 the Director of the Office of Revenue Sharing in the Depart-
ment of the Treasury indicated that "if a community decides to put
revenue sharing into policemen's salaries, the other funds that were
meant to go into policemen's salaries can be used elsewhere. There
is no way we can track that down .... ,,67
59. See note 43 supra.
60. Id.
61. A state government is prohibited from using "directly or indirectly, any part
of the funds it receives under" the Act as a part of the state's matching fund
obligations under other federal grant programs. State and Local Fiscal Assistanco
Act of 1972, 31 U.S.C. § 1223(a) (Supp. II, 1972).
62. For excellent summaries of the cases discussed below see 1 RPEVENU SHAR-
INO BULL., No. 5 (March 1973) and 2 REVENUE SHARINO BULL., No. 2 (Feb.
1974).
63. 356 F. Supp. 291 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
64. Id. at 292-93.
65. Id. at 293.
66. Id. at 299.
67. 1 REVENUE SARmNG BULL., No. 5, at 2 (March 1973) (comment made in
December 1972 by Edward Fox, then interim Director of the Office of Revenue
Sharing, Dep't of the Treasury).
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The Mathews holding was unanticipated by Treasury Department
attorneys. House Report No. 11950, which served as the original
framework for the revenue sharing measure, contained a "local main-
tenance of effort" provision that would have precluded localities
from spending revenue sharing funds indirectly for purposes outside
the priority categories. This provision was removed by the House
Ways and Means Committee before the bill was enacted. Most attor-
neys viewed its deletion as rendering the priority categories listed in
the Act essentially meaningless.
Mathews, however, suggests otherwise. The court ruled that plain-
tiffs had a financial interest in the controversy and therefore had
standing.68 This conclusion was based on a provision of the revenue
sharing law that requires any locality to repay the federal government
110% of any revenue sharing funds spent outside the priority cate-
gories."" The additional 10%, would necessarily come from the taxes
paid by local citizens.70 Since plaintiffs were local taxpayers, the court
concluded that the burden for misspent funds would fall directly
upon them.71
The Mayor of Atlanta and the Board of Aldermen were defendants
in Afathews.7- They argued: (1) that the revenue sharing act im-
posed no restrictions upon the city's general funds that are "freed-up"
by the influx of revenue sharing money;7 3 (2) that the water/sewer
rebate did not conflict with congressional intent as to the use of
revenue sharing funds;74 (3) that while the matching section of the
act specifically prohibits "indirect" use of revenue sharing funds to
match other federal programs, the priority expenditure section does
not;7' 5 and (4) that the Senate committee report admitted that restric-
tions on the use of funds by localities would be impossible to enforce
and were therefore illusory.76
Plaintiffs alleged that the City had violated the revenue sharing
law since it had not, in effect, spent its revenue sharing money within
68. 356 F. Supp. at 295-96.
69. State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972, 31 U.S.C. § 1243(a) (3)
(Supp. 11, 1972).
70. 356 F. Supp. at 296.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 293.
73. Id. at 299.
74. Id. at 300.
75. Id. at 301.
76. Id. at 301-02.
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the specific priority categories.77 They also maintained that those
plaintiffs who did not pay water/sewer fees would be denied equal
protection of the law because they would derive no benefit from the
rebate.78 The court stated:
It is true that the Revenue Sharing Act does not specifically im-
pose any restrictions upon the use of legitimately freed-up funds.
Thus the Act seems dearly to have contemplated that the infusion
of Revenue Sharing funds into state and local governments
would permit future tax relief to the hard-pressed taxpayers of
those governments. Further, there is no requirement that a local
government maintain at pre-Revenue Sharing levels its spending
on "priority expenditures." There is a dear difference, however,
between funds which are legitimately freed up by the designation
of federal Revenue Sharing funds to provide municipal services
which would otherwise have to have been paid for out of general
City funds, and funds which are transferred from one account to
another simply to avoid the restrictions imposed by § 103 (a) of
the Act. The actions [of the city and the statements of the mayor
and three members of the Board of Aldermen] show dearly that
the steps taken by the defendants were designed to carry out a
plan to return $4.5 million in Revenue Sharing funds to certain
taxpayers, the defendants having decided to confer such tax re-
lief by way of rebates on the water/sewer accounts.70
Since the court found that the city's action violated the revenue
sharing law, it enjoined the City from using 4.5 million dollars in
revenue sharing funds in the manner proposed without considering
plaintiffs' equal protection arguments.8 0 The decision is not particu-
larly satisfying to critics of revenue sharing who fear that such manip-
ulations will continue. Other cities will simply avoid issuing public
declarations that would reveal the kinds of activity found improper
in Mathews. The decision would have been more gratifying had it
achieved the same results based on the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment.
The performance of most local and state governments to date sug-
gests that serious enforcement problems may be encountered. In
this regard, three additional important federal restrictions are at-
tached to the use of general revenue sharing funds. First, revenue
sharing funds may not be used in any manner that does not provide
77. Id. at 294.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 299 (footnotes omitted).
80. Id. at 302.
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equal benefits to minorities and women.81 Secondly, a jurisdiction
must follow the same budget procedures in selecting projects to re-
ceive revenue sharing funds that are used for all other budget de-
cisions.82 Thirdly, a copy of each year's "planned" and "actual" use
reports must be published in a general circulation newspaper with
documentation explaining the use of the funds.83
The sanctions available to the Office of Revenue Sharing in the
event of noncompliance by state and local government are deferral
of payments, holding up payments, termination of funds, and re-
quiring the repayment of funds.* Deferral can be imposed immediately
should a recipient government fail to submit the necessary assurances
and report forms85 In October 1973 the Office of Revenue Sharing
held up payments to about 4,000 jurisdictions because they failed to
file their planned use reports. When funds are used for projects not
within one of the eight priority areas, the Secretary of the Treasury,
after giving notice and an opportunity for corrective action, can re-
quire repayment of 110% of the amount spent.86 The repayment
81. State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972, 31 U.S.C. § 1242 (Supp. II,
1972). Section 1242 is patterned after the nondiscrimination requirements and
the fund termination authority of title VI, Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.§ 2000d et seq. (1970). Two notable differences exist between the two laws. Sec-
tion 1242 is broader in scope in that it specifically prohibits discrimination on the
basis of sex, and, unlike title VI, it contains no specific exemption from its coverage
for certain employment practices.
This discussion of enforcement issues is based on a paper by Morton Sklar.
M. Sklar, The Impact of Revenue Sharing on Minorities and the Poor 4 (1974)
(presented at the OEO-sponsored Legal Services Training Program at College
Park, Maryland, January 29, 1974) (copy on file with L. Susskind). On April
30, 1974, the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law filed a civil rights
complaint before the United States Treasury Department on behalf of black resi-
dents of Ouachita Parish, Louisiana, alleging that the Parish government was
guilty of a broad range of discriminatory acts. The complainants requested that
the Treasury Department take all necessary steps, including deferment of further
revenue sharing payments, until the inequalities in public service delivery are cor-
rected. Cain v. Ouachita Parish (complaint filed before the U.S. Treasury Dep't,
Office of Revenue Sharing, Apr. 30, 1974).
82. State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972, 31 U.S.C. § 1243(a) (4)
(Supp. II, 1972).
83. Id. § 1241(c). Two other requirements of somewhat lesser concern are the
anti.matching provision and a stipulation that locally prevailing wage rates must
be paid by contractors working on projects receiving more than 25% of their
funding via General Revenue Sharing. Id. §§ 1223(a), 1243(a) (6).
84. Sklar, supra note 81, at 5.
85, State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972, 31 U.S.C. §§ 1243(a) (5) (C),
(b) (Supp. II, 1972).
86. Id. § 1243(a) (3).
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clause applies only to priority expenditure violations and, unlike
the other types of noncompliance, does not require an opportunity
for a hearing.
The nondiscrimination provisions require somewhat different pro-
cedures before termination.87 Notice of noncompliance is given to the
governor of the state involved, and he is requested to secure compli-
ance with the Act. If within a "reasonable time" the governor fails or
refuses to secure compliance, the Secretary of the Treasury "is au-
thorized (I) to refer the matter to the Attorney General with a rec-
ommendation that an appropriate civil action be instituted; (2) to
exercise the powers and functions provided by title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964; or (3) to take such other actions as may be pro-
vided by law."' s The meaning of the last alternative is unclear and
untested. It might require, for example, filing a lawsuit to compel a
recipient to carry out the promises made in its assurance of compli-
ance.
89
The Atlanta case is not the only indication of local noncompliance
with statutory provisions. In September 1973 several minority indi-
viduals and civil rights groups filed an administrative petition with
the Office of Revenue Sharing charging the Chicago police depart-
ment with discriminatory employment practices.00 Their petition was
based in part upon a report of the Justice Department indicating that
personnel practices of the Chicago police department adversely af-
fected minority groups. Proceeding under the Civil Rights Act of
1964, the Justice Department had filed suit in August 1973 to compel
the police department to change its procedures. In spite of the
fact that the police department has received over 50% of Chicago's
revenue sharing funds, the Office of Revenue Sharing notified the
petitioners that it had no authority to withold funds from Chicago
while the Justice Department suit was being considered by a court.
The Atlanta and Chicago experiences suggest there is good reason to
believe that state and local officials will try to ignore rules established
to ensure accountability for wrongful use of funds and to prevent
discrimination.
87. Sklar, supra note 81, at 6.
88. State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972, 31 U.S.C. § 1242(b) (Supp.
I, 1972).
89. Id.
90. 2 REVENUE SHAING BULL., No. 5 (Feb. 1974), plus materials supplied
to Lawrence Susskind by Harold Himnelman of the Lawyers' Committee for Civil
Rights Under Law in Washington, D.C.
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One final concern is the extent to which state and local govern-
ments possess the management capability necessary to plan for the
effective use of unrestricted federal funds. Mayors and their chief
budget officers have several options. They can use revenue sharing
money to initiate new programs, but unwillingness to do so is wide-
spread since the revenue sharing program may not continue beyond
its present authorization. Therefore, localities that use revenue shar-
ing funds to initiate new programs may be forced to absorb the full
cost of such programs in the future. A number of communities used
their initial revenue sharing checks to underwrite the cost of capital
improvement projects that had been held in abeyance for some time.
The use of large sums of revenue sharing money for capital construc-
tion can minimize a city's long-term indebtedness by avoiding the
need for municipal bond issues. Using funds for capital improvements
has the additional advantage of not creating new civil service posts
that the city might have to fund in the future should revenue shar-
ing end.
City officials can also use revenue sharing to replace those categori-
cal grants reduced by the Nixon Administration. Although General
Revenue Sharing was intended to involve only "new" money, the Ad-
ministration has instead transferred, impounded or arbitrarily cut-off
funds already designated for certain domestic programs into revenue
sharing accounts.91 Elected officials may also consider the possibility
of placing revenue sharing funds in with their own general revenue
accounts. They could then use those funds to cover inflation and
salary increases built into public employee contracts. Choosing this
option would help to forestall local tax increases. The final option,
of course, and perhaps the most attractive, is to use revenue sharing
funds to pay the costs of ongoing operations thereby permitting tax
reductions.
The fact that more than half of the governments receiving revenue
sharing funds failed to allocate any of these funds during the first year
or two should not be overlooked. This suggests that not only has the
financial squeeze been exaggerated, but also that many communities
may be unable to manage large amounts of unrestricted funds on short
notice. The reduction in federal administrative requirements brought
about by revenue sharing was supposed to achieve both increased
91. See Phillips, New Federalism Report/Federal Budget Cuts Turn Mayors
Against Administration Revenue Sharing Plans, 5 NAT'L J. REP. 1099, 1102(1973).
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efficiency at the local level and the stabilization of local administrative
costs. Instead of monitoring administrative arrangements, it was ex-
pected that new city and state employees could devote their time to
actual problem-solving. In reality, few if any new personnel were
hired with general revenue sharing funds. Moreover, local investments
in improved planning and management have not been forthcoming.
C. Will Decentralization Encourage Innovation and
Serve the Disadvantaged?
Critics of the categorical grant system have argued that truly crea-
tive federalism requires diversity and dissent, which are stifled when
rules are imposed from above. Recent experience with block grants,
however, suggests that external pressures imposed by Congress and
executive agencies are more likely to stimulate innovation, because
of intense competition for limited funds, than is a system in which
states assume that they are entitled to funds regardless of past per-
formance.92
Decentralists also argue that the strongest impediment to state and
local innovation has been a lack of funds. State legislatures and city
councils are constantly engaged in a race to find new revenues just to
keep already established programs alive. Supporters of the New
Federalism would have us believe that this is the major constraint on
the innovative tendencies of state and local officials. Such analysis
ignores the political pressures that generally oppose innovation and
anything but the "tried and true" approach. The issue is not one of
innovation for its own sake, but rather of encouraging experimenta-
tion aimed at discovering and institutionalizing more effective means
to deliver public services. Decategorization, and revenue sharing in
particular, work at cross-purposes to this set of objectives. Unre-
stricted grants do not single out critical problem areas or provide
inducements sufficient to overcome the normal inertia at the state
and local level as do categorical grants. Eliminating matching pro-
visions and pre-planning requirements minimizes the long-term pros-
pects for institutionalization. Finally, dispensing with the clearing-
house function previously performed by federal agencies reduces the
likelihood of diffusing new ideas through the maze of state and local
governments. Although state governments have initiated important
92. See Susskind, supra note 49.
[Vol. 8:33
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol8/iss1/3
REVENUE SHARING
programs such as social security, the list of innovations stimulated by
federal matching grants is far more extensive.
Another important consideration is the impact that general revenue
sharing is likely to have on the structure of local decision-making and
community power. For many years, categorical grants-in-aid have
been awarded directly to minority groups, neighborhood boards, non-
profit corporations, and private firms willing to meet the stringent
requirements imposed by the federal government. For many of these or-
ganizations, federal funds provided self-sufficiency and a measure of in-
dependence from those in power. Groups without significant leverage
at the local level, but with demonstrable needs, found solace and sup-
port at the federal level. The switch to general revenue sharing and
state-controlled block grants has already threatened the survival of
many of these groups. The unwillingness of most city officials to use
revenue sharing funds for new social programs or to pick up the cost
of projects abandoned during the transition to unrestricted aid pro-
vides ample support for the complaints of minority groups who fear
the effects of revenue sharing.
IV. CATEGORICAL GRANTS-IN-AID REvIsITED
The pros and cons of block grants and categorical grants were being
discussed as early as 19613 At that time, the ACIR decided to vote
against a switch from a categorical grant to a block grant format in
the health field and listed ten reasons why it did not recommend the
change. All seem equally valid today.
Block grants:
(1) require larger outlays than categorical aids since they broaden
programmatic objectives and increase the number of eligible
recipients;
(2) encompass program areas broader than the sum of the cate-
gorical aids thereby widening the area of national standards and
increasing national control over state affairs;
(3) enforce a centralization of state administrative organization
in the interest of simplifying national audit and review of pro-
gram funds;
(4) impair the application of sanctions for state failure to meet
national objectives;
(5) dilute national objectives sought by the Congress since the
grants are not directed toward specific ends;
93. See ADVISORY COM.n'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, MODIFICA-
TIONS OF FLDERAL GRANTS-IN-AID FOR PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICES (1961).
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(6) reduce the number of appropriation items and may make an
appropriation appear large in terms of the vaguely defined needs;
(7) do not, in the end, lessen the need for categorical aids-a
specific national problem still requires the introduction of a new
categorical program to obtain an immediate allocation of state
funds for that purpose;
(8) require, when they replace categorical grants, an increase
in federal funds to assure that no state loses any funds and that
all states are brought up to a minimum level;
(9) do not ensure or even encourage the uniform development
of programs on a nation-wide basis; and
(10) are not likely to stimulate the appropriation of state and
local funds for the development of new programs to meet prob-
lems of national concern.94
There are, of course, arguments on the other side, but these tend to
rely more on the deficiencies of the categorical approach than on the
advantages of block grants.
In the past, when Congress felt that a problem required the atten-
tion of the national government, it created a new categorical program.
Problems of continuing concern received support year after year. In
other instances, however, problems ceased to be of importance.
Currently, for example, concern for air pollution problems is on the
upswing while support for tuberculosis control and agricultural train-
ing has diminished. Once a federal grant program begins, however, it
is very hard to dismante.95 The ebb and flow in the interpretation
of national priorities has unfortunately not often prompted efforts to
phase out categorical grants that have outlived their usefulness.
Congress has identified several obstacles to the termination or re-
direction of categorical grants-in-aid.96 Vested interests, both public
and private, are created every time a new grant program is initiated.
In addition to the normal survival instincts displayed by administra-
tive personnel at all levels, most federal administrators are not notably
concerned about the overall problem of intergovernmental fiscal bal-
ance or with the proliferation of grants-in-aid. For the most part, they
have developed a narrow sense of mission with respect to their partic-
ular programs. Given their somewhat partisan point of view, it is not
94. See id.
95. SENATE CoMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, PERIODIC CONORESSIONAL
REASSESSMENT OF FEDERAL GRANTS-IN-A) TO STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
10-13 (1967).
96. See id.
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surprising that they invariably favor the perpetuation and expansion
of categorical grants.97
Private sector groups (such as professional organizations, suppliers
of materials, or providers of services normally purchased with grant
funds) are interested in seeing their grant programs continue. They
strongly resist all attempts to reduce or eliminate federal appropria-
tions, presumably because they find it easier to lobby for the contin-
uation of an existing national appropriation than to obtain new or in-
creased appropriations from state or local government. Efforts to
redirect grant programs toward newer and more urgent problems
usually result in an additional appropriation to an existing program
rather than a replacement appropriation, or the creation of a new
categorical grant rather than the elimination of an old one.
Congress continually initiates new grant-in-aid programs with no
real sense of overall purpose. Individual programs and single-function
agencies continue to proliferate at the federal and state levels along
with local special districts and authorities. While new programs are
continually added, existing grants are rarely eliminated. Contribut-
ing to the problem, perhaps, is the absence of a single congressional
committee responsible for reviewing the whole array of grants-in-aid.
Once a particular grant has continued for a number of years, it be-
comes an integral part of state and local budgets and constitutes one
of the assumed sources of revenue in the state or local budgetary
process. State and local officials are therefore reluctant to support
any grant reduction. Should federal funds be reduced, a greater state
or local appropriation would be needed to maintain a particular
program at a given level.
97. Comprehensive surveys of federal, state and local officials involved in the
administration of grant programs have revealed a number of very disturbing trends.
Sec HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, REPLIES FRoar STATE AND
LOCAL GOVERNMIENTS TO QUESTIONNAnRE ON INTERGOVERNmENTAL RELATIONS,
H.R. REP. No. 575, 85th Cong., Ist Sess. (1957); STAFF Or SuBcoms,. ON INTER-
GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS OF THE SENATE CO'mm. ON GOVERNMENT OPERA-
TIONS, THE FEDERAL SYSTEM AS SEEN BY STATE AND LOCAL OFFICIALS, 88th
Cong,, Ist Sess. (Comm. Print 1963). A catalogue of "friction points" in the
intergovernmental system was prepared for the National Association of State Bud-
get Officers. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, FEDERAL GRANT-IN-AID REQUIRE-
MENTS IMPEDING STATE ADMINISTRATION (1966). For additional information on
the problems of intergovernmental coordination as seen from the point of view of
state and local officials see D. WRIGHT & R. McANAw, AMERICAN STATE ADIuNi-
STRATORS (1965); Walker, Federalism Today, 53 NAT'L Cwso R.V. 535 (Nov.
1964).
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Very little is known about what happens to a federal grant-in-aid
program after it is approved by Congress. No one is quite sure
whether or to what extent individual grant programs succeed or fail.
Delays at the federal level caused by the timing of appropriations and
the promulgation of rules and regulations can create a serious gap
between a program's approval and its actual initiation. Additional
delays are almost always encountered in gearing up the necessary
administrative machinery. Frequently state governments are unwilling
or unprepared to play their part. When federal funds ultimately
filter down to the state and local level, they sometimes fall into the
wrong hands. For the most part, communities that do not possess the
technical skill, the money to do the requisite pre-planning, or the
required matching funds, are left out-although in some cases they
may be the communities most in need of assistance. The impact of
individual grant programs is, of course, very difficult to measure. By
the time a grant program begins to operate smoothly, the particular
crisis that prompted its initiation may have already passed. Moreover,
since agencies involved in administering grant programs are unlikely
to report their own failures and outside information is rarely avail-
able, attempts to evaluate programs have been severely handicapped.
Federal departments experience difficulty coordinating programs
and services within their own agencies and with other departments
and agencies. Responsibility for coordinating the efforts of various
bureaus in a given department is, in most cases, fragmented. When
responsibility is assigned, staffing arrangements are often inadequate.
Various attempts to design new administrative tools for managing
the grant application process, auditing accounts, or evaluating the
success of particular projects have failed. Interdepartmental coordi-
nation at the regional level has accomplished very little. Until very
recently, regional office directors were given very little decision-mak-
ing power. More often than not, they were unable to coordinate their
own activities with other federal agencies operating in the same region.
In addition, federal departments and their respective bureaus and
divisions have done very little to develop favorable relationships with
state and local agencies.
V. ALTERNATIVE FoaIs OF FEDERAL AID
Alternative forms of federal aid must be examined from a number
of perspectives with a view toward their anticipated fiscal impacts and
the distribution of power that they imply. It is important, for example,
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to understand what impact each form of federal assistance might have
on the national economy, what effect each would have on the ability
of the federal budget to act as a built-in stabilizer (that is, as a means
of offsetting fluctuations in economic activity), and what effect each
would have on the progressivity of the overall tax structure or
the distribution of personal income. Equally important is the
extent to which each form of federal fiscal assistance might help to
achieve equalization among high- and low-income states or among
various economic strata. Similarly, one must examine the extent to
which each form of federal aid would tend to increase national in-
fluence over state and local policy-making or to enhance the power of
central cities in relation to rural- and suburban-dominated state
legislatures. s
The choices are limited: categorical grants-in-aid for specific pur-
poses: block giants for use in certain broad areas; federal-state shar-
ing of a fixed portion of federal income tax revenues for unrestricted
purposes; federal income tax credits for the payment of state and
local taxes; or federal tax cuts that might make future increases in
state and local taxes somewhat more palatable.
A. Categorical Grants-in-Aid
To be eligible for most categorical grants-in-aid, states usually must
match the national contribution at a specified rate. Aid to Families
with Dependent Children, for example, requires a state to pay between
35% and 50% of the program cost, depending upon each states per
capita income. While the wealthiest must contribute one dollar from
their own funds for each dollar received, the poorest contribute only
54 cents. The interstate highway program, in contrast, requires each
state to pay 10% of the total cost regardless of its per capita income.
For all categorical grants-in-aid, the states pay an average of one-
third the program cost, although there is great diversity among pro-
grams as to required matching rates.09
It has been suggested that the desire of national politicians to supply
conditional grants is more constrained than the desire of state and
98. The perspectives for analysis presented here are a modified version of the
criteria that Weidenbaum suggests for evaluating alternative grant-in-aid and fed-
eral management strategies. WFEMENBAUM 31.
99. R. N\AGNER, Tuz, FIscAL ORGANIZATION oF ADIEWCAN FBDF.RAL1$31 25-26(1971).
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local politicians to accept them.100 Some grants may be virtually free
to state and local officials (assuming that the federal government will
permit existing operating expenditures to double as matching funds),
while national politicians must levy the taxes necessary to finance
them. Conditional grants are also a vehicle by which national politi-
cians can secure local votes without violating constitutionally defined
governmental responsibilities.
A number of studies suggest that categorical grants can distort the
pattern of state and local expenditures:
[Categorical g]rants have been criticized for misdirecting state and
local expenditures, for rigidifying state budgetary procedures,
for curtailing local autonomy, for undermining state and local
incentives both to spend their funds wisely and to raise enough
of them from local sources, and for shifting too many public
responsibilities to Washington so that political power is unduly
centralized and citizens are prevented from participating actively
in the choice and administration of governmental programs.010
Nevertheless, greater reliance on conditional grants-in-aid need not
adversely affect the progressivity or stabilizing effects of the overall
tax system. Moreover, most categorical grant programs have an equaliz-
ing effect. Decisions to focus additional funds on certain problem
areas have a redistributive impact. This has been true primarily be-
cause most allocation formulae have been based, at least in part, on
population or per capita levels of income. 0 2 A possibility always
exists that an expansion of federal grants-in-aid might intensify the
regressive character of state and local taxes. This would occur, how-
ever, only if federal matching requirements created additional pres-
sure for state and local tax increases.
The basic economic justification for functional grants-in-aid is the
spill-over of benefits accruing from some of the most important state
and local expenditure programs. 0 3 Categorical grants also serve as
100. Id. at 42. Wagner provides a rather elaborate mathematical analysis of
fiscal federalism and the basis for institutional resistance to reforms in intergov-
ernmental relations.
101. G. BEAx, INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
83 (1967).
102. See Wedenbaum, Shifting the Composition of Government Spending:
Implications for the Regional Distribution of Income, 17 REGIONAL ScL Ass'N 163
(1966).
103. BREAKC, supra note 101, at 105. He refers to Ainsworth, A Comment
on Professor Monypenny's Political Analysis of Federal Grants-in-Aid, 13 NAT'L
TAx J. 282 (1960), for a concise presentation of the economic case for federal
grants, based primarily on the existence of spillover benefits.
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catalysts in situations in which coordinated regional action is needed.
For various reasons, however, cities, counties and states have been
unable to work together. 0o
B. Block Grants
Unrestricted block grants are used extensively in other countries
such as Australia, West Germany and Canada.20 They have a moder-
ately equalizing effect between the high and low income states al-
though they have no effect on the overall progressivity of the tax
structure. Such open-ended block grants are ideally suited for offset-
ting or balancing state or local fiscal deficiencies arising from a high
concentration of low-income families (resulting in extraordinary
service requirements). This approach, however, is far from ideal for
urban areas if grants are channeled through the states. The resulting
two-step process tends to exacerbate the difficulties that metropolitan
areas typically experience in obtaining a fair share of state funds.
Consolidated block grants allocated directly to cities and towns might
avoid this problem.
Some observers have urged that only unconditional block grants can
compensate for disparities in resources and allow for the attainment
of optimum levels of government activity in accord with locally or
regionally accepted goals. The unconditional block grant may be the
most satisfactory way of bringing about an overall equalization of
financial resources.1 05 Of course, this assumes a budgetary situation
in which, at full employment levels, federal tax receipts expand more
rapidly than federal expenditures.
Unlike other forms of federal aid, unconditional grants go directly
to the root of the fiscal dilemma allegedly plaguing state and local
governments. They provide a new revenue source that grows as
rapidly as the national economy expands and income levels rise.
Critics such as Wilbur Mills have asserted that unconditional block
grants would separate responsibility for collecting taxes from the actual
104. BREAK, supra note 101, at 106.
105. For a review of present grant-in-aid policies and practices in Canada,
Australia and West Germany see M. LEVY & J. D. ToREs, FEDERAL REVENUE
SHARING WITH THE STATES: PROBLEMS AND PRoMISEs 60-78 (1970). See also
ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, IN SEARCH OF BALANCE,
CANADA'S INTERGOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM (1971) (available U.S. Gov't Printing
Office).
106. J. DUE, GOVERNMENT FINANCE: ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 323-
25 (4th ed. 1968).
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allocation decisions. A number of Democratic leaders have urged
that consolidated, as opposed to unconditional, block grants would
not force the national government to give up significant leverage.
They point out that consolidated block grants in broad functional
areas could still be used to induce certain reforms in state and local
government.
C. Tax Sharing
A third alternative would be for the national government to share a
fixed portion of income tax revenues with the states. This approach
means that high-income states with above-average federal tax pay-
ments would receive the largest share of federal aid. As in the case of
unconditional block grants, this approach would diminish the role
of the federal government. The states would be free to determine
how their shared tax money would be used. Tax sharing is attractive
in its simplicity. It promises a large and growing source of revenue
and reinforces the progressive distribution of federal, state and local
fiscal burdens. Those who are opposed, however, fear that tax shar-
ing will drain funds from higher priority national purposes and that
these funds will go into "leaky state purses." Further, several Senators
have argued that a generous tax sharing arrangement would lead to
a relaxation of state-local fiscal efforts, and that tax sharing would not
meet the total needs of local governments, particularly those in cen-
tral cities and metropolitan areas.10 7
D. Tax Credits
Tax credits differ from tax sharing in two important ways. Under a
tax credit system the imposition, collection and administration of taxes
would be handled entirely by state governments. 108 State govern-
ments would be free to increase or decrease tax rates on their own.
This type of federal assistance would allow federal income taxpayers
to write off a generous portion of their state and local taxes. It would
also allow them to deduct either their state and local tax payments
from taxable income, as they can do now, or a fixed portion of their
state and local tax payments from their federal tax bills.
107. IELLER, supra note 8, at 148-49.
108. Weidenbaum points out that the tax structure currently provides credits
for two types of state taxes: a limited credit for state death taxes against federal
estate tax liabilities, and a 90% credit against general payroll levies for payments
into state unemployment compensation systems. WEmENBAUBI 39.
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The benefits of this approach would accrue to persons in low- and
middle-income tax brackets. Persons in higher tax brackets already
enjoy a liberal write off through itemization. Federal tax credits
would give state and local governments an incentive to place more
reliance on income taxes in order to maximize federal tax-saving pos-
sibilities. This could help local as well as state governments by soften-
ing resistance to increases in state and local taxes. Also, the federal
role would be reduced both in the national economy and in relation
to state and local governments. The only drawback is that the
stabilizing impact and the progressivity of the overall tax structure
would tend to be reduced to the extent that progressive and income-
elastic federal taxes would be replaced by state and local levies less
progressive and less responsive to economic growth.109
E. Federal Tax Cuts
A federal tax cut is an alternative to categorical grants, uncondi-
tional grants, or tax sharing. First, federal tax cuts might stimulate
economic expansion. Secondly, in those states that treat federal in-
come tax as a deductible item, federal tax cuts would increase the tax
base and thus tax revenues. In discussing these two effects, Walter
Heller estimates that an extra three billion dollars a year flowed into
state and local coffers from the 1964 tax cut alone, a seven per cent
increase for both state and local tax revenues.110 If this estimate is
correct, the federal tax cut was responsible for nearly 90% of the 3.5
billion dollar increase in tax revenue enjoyed by state and local
governments between 1965 and 1966.71,
Tax reductions have the advantage of allowing states and localities
maximum discretion in choosing whether or not to increase service
levels or taxes. Yet in the eyes of some observers, tax cuts would only
reduce the federal role in key problem areas without providing
guarantees that states and localities would increase their taxes and
sers ices. Others point out that a tax cut would not help to equalize
interstate fiscal burdens. Whether in fact state and local governments
would raise their tax rates under these circumstances is debatable.
To forecast what might be done, it is necessary to determine whether
present state and local tax rates are held down primarily by inter-
109. Id at 40.
1 10. HELLER, supra note 8, at 140.
111. Id.
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governmental competition for business and industry or rather by the
extent to which the federal government has preempted the revenue
field.112 The desirability of tax cuts is heavily influenced by condi-
tions in the national economy:
If strong inflationary pressures were likely as a result of especially
rapid increases in consumer and business spending, a surplus in
the federal budget, which would permit retiring some of the
national debt, would be desirable as an anti-inflationary measure.
However, such would not be likely to be the case if the economy
were generally characterized by recession-like conditions.1 3
F. Categorical Grants Are the Most Effective Alternative
Tax cuts might bring about a decrease in the size of the federal
government, but they would only indirectly meet state and local needs.
Tax sharing and unconditional block grants would provide for the
allocation of public funds among programs selected by state govern-
ments presumably more familiar with the needs and desires of their
own residents than is the national government. No guarantee can be
made, however, that the financial requirements of cities and metro-
politan areas would in turn be met under either the unconditional
grant format or the tax-cut approach. Moreover, whereas high-income
states accrue greater benefit from tax sharing than from other forms
of federal aid,114 low-income states benefit most from a grant-in-aid
approach that contains some kind of equalization provision.
The objective of equality (formulated in interpersonal terms) can
best be served through interstate fiscal equalization. Tax sharing on a
per-capita basis is a means to this end. Additionally, a case can be
made for unconditional equalizing grants to the states. If the federal
government were to assume full financial responsibility for welfare
112. G. Break, Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in the United States IV-85,
-86 (a background paper prepared for the conference held at the Brookings Insti-
tution, Washington, D.C., Nov. 1965).
113. WErIENBAum 41.
114. For an attempt to measure the redistribution effects of both federal grants
and the taxes that finance them see J. MAXWELL, FINANCING STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS 6-30 (1965). See also AnvxsoRa CosuM'N oN INTEROOVERN-
MENTAL RELATIONS, THE ROLE oF EQUALIZATION IN FEDERAL GRANTS (1964).
One additional note: opponents of equalization grants point out that efforts to
counterbalance regional poverty with federal grants only worsens the situation by
weakening the incentives for residents to move to other locatiens where they would
be more productive. This is a highly controversial and as yet unresolved issue.
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costs, or partial responsibility for minimum performance levels in
primary and secondary schools, fiscal ills (to the extent that they exist)
would be relieved and the chances of achieving a significant redistri-
bution of income would certainly be enhanced. 115 Absent such a far-
reaching federal program, categorical grants are dearly the most effec-
tive means of achieving equalization and of guaranteeing minimum
levels of service to target low-income groups. Revenue sharing and
block grants can boost the income of governmental units, but only
categorical grants (or direct income supplements) can guarantee the
provision of sorely needed services to the disadvantaged.
VI. Tim LESSONS OF Tm NEw FEDERALISM
Presently available evidence suggests that a move away from cate-
gorical grants is not likely to achieve the decentralists' desired ob-
jectives. State and local officials may believe that they are better
attuned to local needs, but the public does not have the confidence
in them that it has in the federal government. Political pressures at
the local level are such that many decision-makers are forced to select
short-term "protectionist" strategies (e.g., tax cuts) rather than en-
danger their position by supporting expanded social service pro-
grams or innovative projects that might not bear fruit during their
term of office. The failure of most state and local officials to promote
effective citizen participation merely underscores the fact that physical
proximity to local groups does not necessarily ensure concern for
broadly based community involvement in the decision-making process.
The state and local fiscal crisis forecast in the late 1960's has failed
to materialize. Large surpluses in a number of state budgets suggest
that their one-third share of general revenue sharing funds is not serv-
ing any important purpose. At the municipal level, the budget prob-
lem is not financial but managerial, and the switch to block grants and
revenue sharing is not likely to improve local management capabili-
ties. Members of Congress who opposed "deficit sharing" in 1972 on
the ground that state and local governments had not taxed them-
selves sufficiently were undoubtedly correct.
Reason exists to believe that states and localities cannot be trusted
to abide by federal prohibitions against discriminatory and other
inappropriate uses of open-ended grants. Moreover, Mathews sug-
gests that Congress probably ought to add an explicit maintenance-of-
I 15. Musgrave & Polinsky, supra note 9, at 37-38.
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effort clause to any extension of the general revenue sharing bill.
Priority areas expressed in the law need to be tightened considerably
and more stringent reporting and auditing procedures must be im-
plemented if Congress desires needy areas to receive benefits in pro-
portion to their requirements.
Centralized approaches to federal fiscal assistance promise the most
dramatic redistributional effects. To the extent that Congress is con-
cerned with the problems of people rather than governments, cate-
gorical grants-in-aid are the most effective tool for reaching target
groups. Categorical grants have additional effects that block grants
and general revenue sharing do not. These include stimulating in-
novative approaches to service delivery, forcing communities to "buy
into" projects (thereby enhancing the long-run prospects for institu-
tionalization), and spotlighting certain problems that may have been
systematically negelected. A "sliding scale" of matching requirements
could ensure that especially needy communities are not prohibited
from participating in particularly appropriate categorical grant pro-
grams.
An obvious need exists to streamline the categorical grant-in-aid
system and to find ways to phase out programs that have outlived
their usefulness. Improvements in this area will depend in part on
Congress' willingness to set up a joint committee to review the full
array of grants-in-aid on a regular basis. Finally, there is evidence
suggesting that the states are not likely to be sympathetic to the special
needs of big cities. Reapportionment notwithstanding, state legisla-
tures and chief officials are under strong pressure to distribute funds
evenly throughout their states. Moreover, they are not likely to allo-
cate disproportionate shares to central city residents in spite of their
obviously greater burdens. Only the federal government has proved
willing to address the needs of minority groups with special difficulties.
Each of the forces contributing to the shift in federal aid policy is
not particularly strong, but together they are powerful enough to
effect substantial modifications. There is an obvious quest for greater
efficiency in the operation of grant-in-aid programs. It is not clear,
however, that to increase efficiency at the expense of other national
objectives is worth the price. Equalization and redistribution ought to
be of increasing concern to those responsible for the management of
our grant-in-aid system. Unfortunately there is no clear-cut agreement
as to whether we ought to be aiming for resources equalization among
or within states, or among and within socio-economic strata. Reactions
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to the changing national economic picture also encourage continued
efforts to restructure intergovernmental grants-in-aid, but the reces-
sion/inflation cycle is difficult to anticipate. Yesterday's policy aimed
at reducing fiscal drag may well be contributing to today's inflationary
woes. Attempts to use federal grant-in-aid policy as a tool for national
economic planning may well be counterproductive.
A further catalyst for change in our federal domestic aid policy is
the emergence and re-emergence of pressing social issues. If our cur-
rent domestic aid strategy does not allow a rapid and effective re-
sponse to the "great issues of the day," calls for a restructuring of the
grant-in-aid system are sure to be heard in Congress. The shifting
configuration of political forces wrought by changes in party control
of the White House, the state capitals, and major central cities must
also be considered. To the extent that the President or any other
elected official is under an obligation to a particular constituency, he
will seek to reward that group for its support. If the federal aid
system does not provide the flexibility elected officials need, proposals
for reform are sure to emerge. This mix of political and ideological
considerations is difficult to unravel. No single domestic aid strategy
can attract or retain unilateral support; the coalitions involved are
too unstable. In assessing alternative grant-in-aid strategies, the single
most important rule to keep in mind is that every approach to federal
domestic aid represents compromise on a great number of fronts. Cur-
rently available evidence suggests that the compromises built into the
New Federalism may result in hardships for both central city residents
and the poor. Moreover, there is every reason to believe that de-
categorization of federal grants-in-aid will not achieve the objectives
spelled out by those in favor of decentralization.
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